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Abstract
We present a logic of veriﬁed and unveriﬁed assertions and prove it sound and complete with respect to
its possible-worlds semantics. The logic, a constructive modal logic, is motivated by considerations of the
interpretation of conditionals in natural language semantics, but, we claim, is of independent interest.
1 Motivation
One of us wrote a dissertation on the patterns of temporal reference exhibited by
conditional and modal sentences in English a long time ago [1]. The other one
was always fascinated by the veriﬁcationist logic that emerged, whether you were
concerned with the modelling of conditionals and modals, or not. This one decided
that the logic that emerged, a ‘temporal’ logic of veriﬁed and unveriﬁed assertions
with curious properties, deserved a writing up of its own. Hence this note.
Whether one is concerned with the original application of this logic or not, it
makes sense to explain some of the issues that motivated it. Operators that refer
to tenses like past and present are self-explanatory, but logicians by and large
are blissfully unaware of the subtle issues of interpretation surrounding English
sentences. Consider the sentence:
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(1) If I smile when I get out, the interview went well.
This is an example of deictic shift: deictic shift occurs when a tense locates an
event as being past or present with respect to some time other than the speech time.
At speech time both the presumed interview and smiling (or not) are in the future,
but the sentence orders then as ﬁrst the interview event and then the smiling (or
not) event.
Assume we want to deﬁne meaning as the potential to change states of infor-
mation, instead of the conditions under which something is true. If meaning is
to be explicated in terms of information change, there are two levels under which
temporal reference operates. First temporal references must describe how the world
changes over time. But secondly they have also to explain the way the information
about the world changes over time.
Typically the tenses are taken to state a relation between the time at which some
assertion is made (the speech time) and the time at which the event being described
occurs (the event time). The speech time then serves as the (single) deictic centre
for the tenses.
An alternative is to centre tenses on the time at which an update is made to
one’s stock of information, where this update is the result of the utterance of the
sentence. Some kind of update time would provide the tenses deictic centre rather
than the speech time. In most cases the move from speech time to update time will
make no diﬀerence: normally the update occurs as soon as the utterance is made.
However modal and conditional sentences do not behave in this simple fashion.
They place constraints on the way that updates may be made in the future. Tenses
within the scope of the modal or conditional are centred relative to these future
update times leading to deictic shift. Or so goes the story in the thesis.
Moreover the update should not be considered a single operation, occurring at
a single time. Instead it is necessary to decompose the update into two operations:
assertion and veriﬁcation. Typically, assertion and veriﬁcation occur simultane-
ously, and most sentences convey veriﬁed information. Modals and conditionals by
contrast allow delayed assertion and veriﬁcation. If A, then B means roughly: sup-
pose you were now to assert A; if and when A is veriﬁed, you will be in a position
to assert B, and in due course this assertion will also be veriﬁed. Since A and B
will both be tensed clauses, allowing for both assertion and veriﬁcation times will
lead to several possible shifted interpretations of the clauses.
Establishing the usefulness of this setting for the analysis of modals and con-
ditionals was the main goal of the thesis, but our objective here is much more
restricted. We simply describe the logic that emerged from the analysis, prove
some properties and speculate about more general uses for it.
We shall motivate the logic in terms of information states and its application to
dealing with conditionals in natural language and then deﬁne a (somewhat compli-
cated) semantics for it. Then we provide a proof theory for this logic and show the
required sourness and completeness. We conclude with some speculation on further
uses.
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2 Information States, Tenses and Conditionals
We will ﬁrst take information states as primitive. They will not be construed as sets
of propositions or formulas. It is customary in tense logic to view propositions as
functions from times (and perhaps possible worlds) to truth values. But this is not
how propositions in our information states behave. A proposition in an information
state p is really a short-hand for saying that “p is true at t”.
It makes sense to talk about being in (possession of) a certain information state
at a certain time. All being well, as time goes by this state will grow into other
states that are informational extensions of the original. In reality some of the initial
information may prove to be mistaken, so sometimes information may decrease over
time. Just because information grows over time one should not conclude that the
ordering of information extension (which we write as ) is a temporal order. To do
so would make time forward and backwards branching, but we will assume instead
that time is linear, so there is only one past and one future. 4
Information states and sets of them are essentially non-temporal structures.
Information states and their ordering into sets of possible extensions give a gods-
eye, atemporal view of the world. But if information states are atemporal the same
cannot be said for English sentences. The role of the past and present tenses can
be seen as one of tying the time varying nature of sentences down to the static
assertions found in the information states. We need to show how, via the tenses,
the temporarily varying update potential of sentences maps onto the temporally
ﬁxed relations in information states.
We will assume a logical language L consisting of atomic sentence letters (p, q,
etc . . . plus the absurd sentence ⊥), four connectives (∧,∨,→ and ⇒) and three one
place sentence operators (past,pres and ¬) with parentheses and usual formation
rules.
We will write
s |= φ
to say that the state s can be the result of an update by a sentence φ. This means
that if s |= φ then updating s with φ will have no eﬀect, it will add no further
information, hence leave one still in s. If s |= φ holds we say that φ is supported by
s. The notation s, t |= φ will be used to say that an assertion corresponding to an
utterance φ made at time t is supported by a state s. Using past(p) and pres(p)
to represent simple past and present tense sentences, we can describe the update
eﬀects of utterances of simple tensed sentences as follows:
(i) s, t |= past(p) iﬀ there is some time tp ≤ t such that the assertion p(tp) is
contained in s.
(ii) s, t |= pres(p) iﬀ p(t) is contained in s.
Now an English conditional will consist of two tensed clauses, e.g. (1) above is of
4 You don’t have to agree with this, you can just take it as a simplifying assumption.
D. Crouch, V. de Paiva / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 300 (2014) 3–20 5
the form
pres(p) → past(q)
the tenses of these clauses will be interpreted relative to the future states and times
s′ and t′.
Back to our semantic deﬁnition, for conditional sentences we will say, to begin
with, that a conditional φ → ψ uttered at time t is supported in s just in case for
any state s′ extending s that supports an assertion of the antecedent φ made at
time t′ after t, the state s′ also supports an assertion of the consequent ψ made at
t′.
3. s, t |= φ → ψ iﬀ for all s′ 	 s and all t′ ≥ t, if s′, t′ |= φ then s′, t′ |= ψ
Our information states consist of sets of assertions. We now divide the assertions
contained in an information state into veriﬁed and unveriﬁed assertions at time t.
As time goes by more unveriﬁed assertions become veriﬁed, but no veriﬁed assertion
can become unveriﬁed.
What is to verify an assertion and what is the diﬀerence between veriﬁed and
unveriﬁed assertion? To answer this it helps to note an obvious asymetry between
the future and the past. While we can have knowledge about both past and future,
the origin of our information about the past is quite diﬀerent from the origin of
our information about the future. With information about the past there is usually
some causal chain linking a past event to present information. As for information
about the future, at best, one can extrapolate on the basis of what one knows about
the past and the present.
With veriﬁed information, it is normally assumed that there is some causal chain
linking the information to what the information is about. When a causal chain is
involved, veriﬁcation of information about an event cannot precede the occurrence
of the event. However, there are some cases where veriﬁcation is not causal in origin.
In particular, a case where a degree of prescience seems to apply is in talking about
plans or pre-determined events. When talking about plans, it is not really the world
that we are discussing but what is laid out in the plan. Of the plan, we have a gods-
eye view, so that we can survey in a glance which events are supposed to happen
when. If the plan provides our source of information about these events, then we
can verify that certain events will occur, according to the plan, well in advance of
the time at which those events are supposed to occur. When one says
(3) The sun rises at 05:47 tomorrow.
one is in fact reporting on what is stated in a set of sunrise and sunset tables.
Simple, tensed sentences are normally used to convey veriﬁed information. Up-
dates consist of ﬁrst making an assertion and then marking it as veriﬁed. For simple
sentences, these two operations take place at the same time. This means that the
update eﬀect of a sentence φ at a time t needs to be expanded out as follows:
s, t |= φ iﬀ s, t, t |= φ
The two occurrences of t on the right hand side correspond to the assertion and
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veriﬁcation times respectively. As we can see, to begin with the two times are
assumed to be identical, and correspond to the time at which the sentence is uttered.
The eﬀects of the tenses on atomic sentences may be described as follows:
• s, a, v |= past(p) iﬀ there is a time tp < a such that the assertion p(tp) is veriﬁed
in s at time v.
• s, a, v |= pres(p) iﬀ there is a time tp ≥ a such that the assertion p(tp) is veriﬁed
in s at time v.
Here, a stands for the assertion time and v for the veriﬁcation time. An assertion
p(tp) is veriﬁed in a state s at a time v if p(tp) is contained in the set of assertions
that count as veriﬁed in s at v. (If we represent states as sets of assertions, at any
one time this set will be split into two subsets of veriﬁed and unveriﬁed assertions).
3 Veriﬁed and Unveriﬁed Assertions
We now forget our motivation in terms of tenses and conditionals while still taking
account of the times at which formulas are veriﬁed. In these information mod-
els, each information state can be seen as a linearly ordered sequence of temporal
‘snapshots’ of the state, where diﬀerent formulas are forced at diﬀerent time points.
An information model M is now a quintuple
M = 〈S,⊆t, T,≤, V 〉
where S is a set of information states, s
⊆t is a relation in S × S × T
and is transitive and reﬂexive over S for any t
T is a set of time instants, t
≤ is a (linear) temporal order over T , and
V is a valuation function
The valuation function V is a function from states, times and atomic sentences in
some language L onto the (veriﬁcation) values 1 or 0. This speciﬁes for a state,
time and sentence whether the sentence is veriﬁed at that time in that state.
We impose two monotonicity conditions on the valuation function V :
Monotonicity of direct veriﬁcation (‘in-state’ monotonicity):
For every state s and atomic sentence p
t1 ≤ t2 implies if V (s, t1, p) = 1 then V (s, t2, p) = 1
Monotonicity of information growth (‘out-of-state’ monotonicity):
If s1 ⊆t s2 then for atomic sentences p
(a) {p | V (s1, t, p) = 1} ⊆ {p | V (s2, t, p) = 1}
(b) {p | ∃t : V (s1, t, p) = 1} ⊆ {p | ∃t : V (s2, t, p) = 1}
Monotonicity of direct veriﬁcation says that once an atomic sentence is veriﬁed
within a state, if remains veriﬁed in that state. Monotonicity of direct veriﬁcation
will turn out to apply to all sentences, and not just to atomic ones.
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Monotonicity of information growth says that moving from s1 to a more fully
informed state s2 at some time t veriﬁes the same atomic sentences in s2 at t as were
veriﬁed in s1 at t (condition (a)). It also says (condition (b)) that the sentences
asserted in s1 but not yet veriﬁed in at t continue to be asserted in s2, though the
times at which they becomes veriﬁed in s2 may diﬀer form those in s1. Indeed,
some unveriﬁed assertions in s1 may count as already veriﬁed in s2. In addition, s2
may include veriﬁed and unveriﬁed assertions that were not present at all in s1. If
s2 does not contain any extra assertions (i.e. the ⊆t becomes ≈t in (a) and (b)),
then the two states are informationally equivalent at t. Monotonicity of information
growth does not hold for all non-atomic sentences.
In addition, a convergence of veriﬁcation property is imposed:
Convergence of Veriﬁcation:
If s1 ⊆t1 s2 ⊆t2 s3,
then there is a time t3 such that t3 ≥ t1, t3 ≥ t2 and ∀t4 ≥ t3 s1 ⊆t4 s3
as well as the constraint on absurdity:
No Absurdity:
For no s or t is it the case that V (s, t,⊥) = 1
3.0.1 Semantic Deﬁnitions of Connectives
We now give semantic deﬁnitions for a propositional language involving the connec-
tives ∧,∨,→,¬ and ∼. These specify what is required for a sentence to be veriﬁed
as true at a time t in a state s.
(i) s, t | p iﬀ V (s, t, p) = 1 if p is atomic
(ii) s, t | φ ∧ ψ iﬀ s, t | φ and s, t | ψ
(iii) s, t | φ ∨ ψ iﬀ s, t | φ or s, t | ψ
(iv) s, t | φ → ψ iﬀ ∀t1 ≥ t, s1 ⊇φ,tt1 s : ∃t2 ≥ t1 such that s1, t2 | ψ
(v) s, t | ¬φ iﬀ ∀t1 ≥ t, s1 ⊇φ,tt1 s : ∃t2 ≥ t1 such that s1, t2 | ⊥
(vi) s, t |∼ φ iﬀ ∀t1 ≥ t : s, t1 | φ
Minimal Information Extensions
The semantic deﬁnitions for → and ¬ rely on minimal information extensions.
A minimal information extension can be deﬁned as follows:
• s1 ⊇φ,tt1 s iﬀ
a) s1 ⊇t1 s
b) s1, t1 | φ, and
c)  ∃t2, s2 such that t ≤ t2 < t1, s ⊇t2 s2 ⊇t2 s1, and s2, t2 | φ
That is, if s1 is a minimal extension of s with respect to φ at time t, then s2 is the
ﬁrst state extending s that veriﬁes φ at the earliest time t1.
D. Crouch, V. de Paiva / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 300 (2014) 3–208
Negation
Two types of negation are deﬁned: ‘out-of-state’ negation, ¬, and ‘in-state’
negation ∼. Out-of-state negation says that a sentence will never be veriﬁed in any
future state at any future time. In-state negation says that a sentence will never be
veriﬁed in the current state at any future time.
If a sentence ∼ φ holds in a state s at a time t, the sentence φ is not asserted by
state s. (Note that the monotonicity of direct veriﬁcation will ensure that if ∼ φ
holds in s at any time t, it holds at all times). If ∼∼ φ holds in s at t, then it follows
that at some later time t1, φ will hold in s. Thus ∼∼ φ gives a way of saying that
φ is asserted by a state, though not necessarily as yet veriﬁed in that state.
As well as referring to the two negations as in-state and out-of-state negation,
we can also say that ∼ amounts to a denial of assertion, while ¬ amounts to an
assertion of denial.
3.0.2 Monotonicity
A signiﬁcant feature of the forcing relation in intuitionistic logic is its monotonicity:
once a sentence is forced in one state, it remains forced in all subsequent states.
This holds for all sentences.
Within the information models currently being dealt with, we need to consider
two distinct kinds of monotonicity: in-state monotonicity, and out-of-state mono-
tonicity. In-state monotonicity holds for all sentences, but out-of-state monotonicity
holds only for a restricted set of stable sentences.
Stable sentences are deﬁned below, and are approximately those whose sub-
formulas contain no odd-numbered sequences of in-state negations — thus ∼∼ φ is
stable, but ψ∧ ∼ φ is not. Unstable sentences are ones that state that a particular
sentence is not asserted in a given information state. That a sentence is not asserted
in one state does not preclude it from coming to be asserted in a later state.
In-State Monotonicity
First, we show that all sentences satisfy in-state monotonicity:
In-State Monotonicity:
If s, t | φ then ∀t1 ≥ t : s, t1 | φ
This is a direct consequence of the condition of monotonicity of direct veriﬁcation
(in-state monotonicity for atomic sentences) that was imposed on the valuation
function in information models. For conjunction and disjunction, it is easy to see
that monotonicity carries across from monotonic sentences.
For in-state negation, note that ∼ φ is only forced in state s at t if φ fails to be
forced in s at any time t1 at or after t. Assuming that φ itself behaves monotonically
within the state, this means that φ is forced at no time within the state, and so
∼ φ is forced at all times within the state. Exactly similar arguments apply to ¬φ
— just ignore the reference to future information states in the semantic deﬁnition,
and concentrate on reference to future times within the current state.
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For implication, φ → ψ, assume both φ and ψ behave monotonically. Restricting
attention to what must go on within the state if the semantic conditions for the
implication hold at time t, we ﬁnd that if φ holds at any time t1 after t, then ψ
must hold at some time t2 after t1. Since φ and ψ are monotonic, if this holds at t,
it will also hold at all times t′ after t.
Stable Sentences
Next we deﬁne what stable sentences are.
• If p is atomic, then p is stable.
• If φ and ψ are stable, then φ ∧ φ and φ ∨ ψ are stable.
• φ → ψ is stable if ψ is stable. (Otherwise, it is semi-stable.)
• ¬φ is stable.
• If φ is stable, then ∼∼ φ is stable.
• Anything not classiﬁed as stable by the above is unstable.
A piece of notation that will be used below is that if Γ is a set of formulas or
sentences, then Stable(Γ) denotes the stable subset of Γ.
Out-of-State Monotonicity
It can be shown that all stable sentences satisfy out-of-state monotonicity:
Out-of-State Monotonicity:
If s, t | φ then ∀s1 ⊇t s, t1 ≥ t : s1, t1 | φ
(Proof: by induction on the complexity of φ — given in Appendix.
The converse does not quite hold. There are some unstable formulas that satisfy
out-of-state monotonicity: ∼ φ∨ ∼∼ φ is an example.
4 Proof theory
The semantic deﬁnitions presented above are sound and complete with respect to
the following sequent calculus system (Proof: Appendix).
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∧I
Γ  φ; Γ  ψ
Γ  φ ∧ ψ
∧E
Γ  φ ∧ ψ
Γ  φ
∨I
Γ  φ
Γ  φ ∨ ψ
∨E
Γ  φ ∨ ψ; Γ, φ  χ; Γ, ψ  χ
Γ  χ
→ I
Stable(Γ), φ ∼∼ ψ
Γ  φ → ψ
→ E
Γ  φ; Γ  φ → ψ
Γ ∼∼ ψ
¬I
Stable(Γ), φ ∼∼ ⊥
Γ  ¬φ
⊥
Γ  ⊥
Γ  φ
∼ I
Γ, φ  ⊥
Γ ∼ φ
∼ Ax
Γ ∼ φ∨ ∼∼ φ
∼→
Γ ∼∼ φ; Γ  φ → ψ
Γ ∼∼ ψ
∼∼ ⊥
Γ ∼∼ ⊥
Γ  ⊥
The axiom stating that ∼ φ∨ ∼∼ φ is a direct result of the fact that the ordering
over temporal snapshots is linear, giving rise to the characteristic axiom of Gabbay’s
logic KC.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that our notion of information models with veriﬁed and unveriﬁed
assertions, originally conceived to explain conditionals in natural language semantics
does not lead to something that is logically absurd. By the contrary the logic of
veriﬁed and unveriﬁed assertions can be shown to have a respectable proof system,
satisfying soundness and completeness. It remains to be seen how useful the logic
of veriﬁed and unveriﬁed assertion is as a logic of (non-temporal) conditionals and
modals.
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A Proof of Soundness and Completeness
This appendix shows that the proof theory for a logic of veriﬁed and unveriﬁed
assertions presented is sound and complete with respect to the intended semantics.
Soundness
To prove soundness we must show that
Γ  φ ⇒ Γ |= φ
where Γ |= φ is a short hand for saying that
for any model M , state s and time t such that M, s, t | σ for every σ ∈ Γ,
M, s, t | φ
and Γ  φ means that φ is derivable from premises Γ in the inference system
The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of the derivation Γ  φ. We will
assume a ﬁxed model M .
Atomic Derivations
Soundness of atomic derivations, φ  φ, is trivial. Any model of the premise is
a model of the conclusion. This provides the base case for the induction hypothesis
used below.
Conjunction Introduction
Suppose we have Γ  φ and Γ  ψ. By the induction hypothesis, Γ |= φ and
Γ |= ψ. Choose any state s and time t such that s, t | Γ, from which it follows
that s, t | φ and s, t | ψ. By the semantic deﬁnition of conjunction, s, t | φ ∧ ψ.
Hence it is safe to assume that Γ  φ ∧ ψ.
Conjunction Elimination
Trivial.
Disjunction Introduction
Trivial.
Disjunction Elimination
We have three induction hypotheses: Γ |= φ ∨ ψ, Γ, φ |= χ, and Γ, ψ |= χ.
Let s and t be such that s, t | Γ. Hence s, t | φ ∨ ψ. Hence either s, t | φ
or s, t | ψ. In the ﬁrst case, s, t | Γ, φ, and so by induction hypothesis, s, t | χ.
Similarly in the second case. Either way, s, t | χ, and so Γ |= χ. Hence it is safe
to assume that Γ  χ.
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In-State Negation Introduction
Suppose Γ, φ  ⊥. By the induction hypothesis, Γ, φ |= ⊥. Since ⊥ is never
veriﬁed in any state, we may therefore assume that for no state and time does
s, t | Γ, φ.
Suppose that s, t | Γ. By monotonicity of direct veriﬁcation, for all t1 ≥
t, s, t1 | Γ. Since no state and time force Γ and φ, it follows that ∀t1 ≥ t, s, t1 | φ.
By the semantics of in-state negation, this means that s, t |∼ φ. Hence Γ |=∼ φ
and so it is safe to assume that Γ ∼ φ
In-State Negation Axiom
This is not a rule of inference but an axiom. We must show that s, t |∼ φ∨ ∼∼ φ
for all s, t.
According to semantic deﬁnitions,
(1) s, t |∼ φ iﬀ ∀t1 ≥ t : s, t1 | φ, and
(2) s, t |∼∼ φ iﬀ ∀t1 ≥ t, ∃t2 ≥ t1 : s, t2 | φ
Since the temporal order is linear, (2) is equivalent to
(2a) s, t |∼∼ φ iﬀ ∃t2 ≥ t : s, t2 | φ
It can be seen that (1) and (2a) are complements of one another, and so it follows
that either s, t |∼ φ or s, t |∼∼ φ, for any s and t. Hence by the semantic
deﬁnition of disjunction, s, t |∼ φ∨ ∼∼ φ for all s, t.
Note
The in-state negation axiom is in fact characteristic of ordinary intuitionistic
logic with linear frames. The logic KC (Gabbay 1981:66) adds  ¬φ ∨ ¬¬φ as
a single extra axiom governing intuitionistic negation. KC is sound and complete
with respect to intuitionistic frames where ⊆ is reﬂexive, transitive and linear. Since
the temporal order ≤ is reﬂexive, transitive and linear, the in-state negation axiom
is inevitable.
Implication Introduction
Suppose that Stable(Γ), φ ∼∼ ψ. By the induction hypothesis,
Stable(Γ), φ |=∼∼ ψ. That is, if s, t | Stable(Γ), φ, then ∃t1 ≥ t : s, t1 | ψ.
Let s0, t0 | Γ. Let s and t be a state and time forming a minimal extension
of s0 and t0 with respect to φ. By out-of-state monotonicity, ∀t′ ≥ t0, s′ ⊇t′ s0 :
s′, t′ | Stable(Γ),and so s, t | Stable(Γ). By the induction hypothesis s, t | φ and
so ∃t1 ≥ t : s, t1 | ψ.
These are the semantic conditions required for φ → ψ to hold in s0, t0. So it is
safe to assume that Γ  φ → ψ.
Implication Elimination
Suppose Γ  φ and Γ  φ → ψ. By the induction hypothesis, Γ |= φ and
Γ |= φ → ψ. According to the semantic deﬁnition of implication, if s, t | φ and
D. Crouch, V. de Paiva / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 300 (2014) 3–20 13
s, t | φ → ψ, then there is a t1 ≥ t such that s, t1 | ψ. From which we conclude
that s, t |∼∼ ψ. Hence, Γ |=∼∼ ψ, and so it is safe to assume that Γ ∼∼ ψ.
Out-of-State Negation Introduction
It is possible to deﬁne out-of-state negation as ¬φ =df φ → ⊥, eliminating the
need for a separate introduction rule. Its introduction rule can be shown to be
sound analogously to implication introduction, noting that no state or time is ever
such that s, t |∼∼ ⊥.
Absurdity
Suppose Γ  ⊥, and so by induction hypothesis Γ |= ⊥. Since there are no states
s or times t such that s, t | ⊥, one can safely assume that Γ |= φ for any φ.
Future Absurdity
Suppose Γ ∼∼ ⊥, and so by induction hypothesis Γ |=∼∼ ⊥. By the semantic
of ∼ if s, t |∼∼ ⊥, then ∃t1 ≥ t such that s, t1⊥. Since there are no states or
time that force ⊥, there can be no states of times that force ∼∼ ⊥. So it is safe to
conclude that Γ |= ⊥ and so Γ  ⊥.
Future Implication Elimination
Suppose Γ ∼∼ φ and Γ  φ → ψ. By the induction hypothesis, Γ |=∼∼ φ and
Γ |= φ → ψ. According to the semantics of ∼, if s, t |∼∼ φ, then ∃t1 ≥ t such that
s, t1 | φ. By in-state monotonicity, if s, t | φ → ψ then s, t1 | φ → ψ as well. By
semantics of implication, ∃t2 ≥ t1 such that s, t2 | ψ. And so ∃t2 ≥ t such that
s, t2 | ψ. Thus s, t |∼∼ ψ. Hence Γ |=∼∼ ψ, and so Γ ∼∼ ψ.
Completeness
The proof of completeness is a variation on the Henkin-style completeness proofs for
intuitionistic used by Aczel, Fitting and Thomason (van Dalen 1984), and also by
Veltman (1985) for Data Semantics. The method involves constructing information
states that are represented as saturated sets of formulas. A number of deﬁnitions
and proofs concerning saturated sets are therefore required before proving complete-
ness.
Saturated Theories
Suppose that we have a language L containing a set of sentences Γ, such that
Γ  φ
We can construct a saturated extension of Γ relative to (an enumeration of) the
sentences in L and φ, Sat(Γ, φ, L), such that
(a) Sat(Γ, φ, L) is closed under 
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(b) Γ ⊆ Sat(Γ, φ, L)
(c) If ψ ∨ χ ∈ Sat(Γ, φ, L), then either ψ ∈ Sat(Γ, φ, L) or χ ∈ Sat(Γ, φ, L)
(d) φ ∈ Sat(Γ, φ, L)
The construction proceeds inductively as follows.
(i) Stage 0:
Let Δ0 = Γ
(ii) Stage k + 1:
Let ψ1 ∨ψ2 be the ﬁrst disjunction in the enumeration of L that has not so far
been dealt with, where Δk  ψ1 ∨ ψ2.
Then Δk+1 = Δk ∪ {ψ1} if Δk ∪ {ψ1}  φ
Δk ∪ {ψ2} otherwise.
(iii) Sat(Γ, φ, L) =
⋃
k≥0Δk
The deﬁnition and construction, as well as the proofs that (a)–(d) hold, are taken
from van Dalen 1984. We start by establishing the disjunction property, (c).
(c)
Let ψ ∨ χ ∈ Sat(Γ, φ, L), and let k be the least number such that Δk  ψ ∨ χ.
Then Δi  ψ ∨ χ for all i ≥ k. ψ ∨ χ cannot be treated before stage k, so suppose
that it is treated at state j ≥ k. Then either ψ ∈ Δj+1 or χ ∈ Δj+1. And
Δj+1 ⊆ Sat(Γ, φ, L)
(a)
Sat(Γ, φ, L) is closed under . For is Sat(Γ, φ, L)  ψ, then Sat(Γ, φ, L)  ψ ∨ψ.
So by property (c), ψ ∈ Sat(Γ, φ, L).
(b)
That Γ ⊆ Sat(Γ, φ, L) is evident from the construction.
(d)
Clearly, Δ0  φ. If Δk  φ, then Δk+1  φ. For let φ ∨ ψ be the k + 1th
disjunction treated, i.e. Δk  φ ∨ ψ. Clearly, Δk ∪ {φ}  φ, so ψ must be added.
Moreover, Δk, ψ  φ, for if it did and Δk  φ∨ψ, then it could not be that Δk  φ.
Which saturated extension of Γ one gets is dependent on the order in which the
sentences in L are enumerated. When constructing sets of saturated extensions for
Γ, as we will do below, it is assumed that all possible enumerations are employed.
Saturated theories will form the state snapshots used to build canonical models
used to establish completeness.
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Statement of Completeness Problem
To prove completeness, we must show that
Γ |= φ ⇒ Γ  φ
Put in contrapositive form, and expanding out the meaning of |=, this amounts to
Γ  φ ⇒ Γ |= φ, i.e.
Γ  φ ⇒ there is a model, state and time such that M, s, t | Γ but M, s, t | φ.
The general strategy for proving completeness is to construct a saturated exten-
sion relative to Γ, φ and some enumeration of the language. This forms the state
and time that forces Γ. We then build up temporal extensions of the state, as well as
new states plus their temporal extensions, all of which are also saturated theories.
We show that for any such theory, Σts, (i.e. state s taken at time t), s, t | ψ iﬀ
ψ ∈ Σts. Since Σ00 is just a saturated extension of Γ relative to φ, we have Γ ⊆ Σ00,
but φ ∈ Σ00. This establishes the contrapositive of completeness.
Constructing State Snapshots
Suppose that we have some saturated extension of a set of sentences Γ relative to φ
and a given enumeration of L. Call it Σ0, and take it as the initial snapshot of the
state. Subsequent snapshots, Σi are constructed relative to the same enumeration
of the language as follows:
• Σi+1: Let ∼∼ ψ be the ﬁrst double negation not so far dealt with, such that
Σi ∼∼ ψ.
• Construct a saturated theory from Σi ∪ {ψ} as follows
· Step 0:
Let Δ0 = Σ
i ∪ {ψ}
· Step k + 1:
Let ψ1∨ψ2 be the ﬁrst disjunction not so far dealt with such that Δk  ψ1∨ψ2.
Δk+1 = Δk ∪ {ψ1} iﬀ Σi ∼∼ ψ1 or Σi  ψ1
Δk ∪ {ψ2} otherwise.
· Σi+1 = ⋃k≥0Δk
It is straightforward to show that the conditions (a)–(c) of saturated sets apply to
these temporal snapshots. The ﬁnal property (d), that φ is not contained in any
Σi, where φ is the sentence used in the construction of the saturated extension to
Γ, does not always hold; if φ is a stable sentence, it may well get added to some Σi.
But in exchange for this condition, it can be shown that the following holds:
For all Σi, if ψ ∈ Σi, then ∼∼ ψ ∈ Σ0
Constructing an Information Model
To construct an information model where Γ |= φ given that Γ  φ
(i) Construct a saturated extension, Σ00, of Γ relative to φ and some enumeration
of L, and construct a sequence of temporal snapshots, Σi0 relative to the same
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language enumeration.
(ii) Take Stable(Σ00) and construct saturated extensions from it relative to the
absurd proposition ⊥, and temporal extensions of these saturated extensions.
These form the information states of the canonical information model.
(iii) For any Σts and Σ
t
s′ formed in this, set
s ⊆t s′ iﬀ
(a) Stable(Σts) ⊆ Stable(Σts′), and
(b) for any semi stable implication φ → ψ ∈ Σts, if ¬ψ ∈ Σts′ then φ → ψ ∈
Σts′
(iv) The valuation function for atomic sentence letters coincides with the atomic
sentences contained in a given state s at time t, i.e. Σts.
We need to establish the models constructed in this way are legitimate informa-
tion models. It is easy to show that the relation ⊆t is transitive and reﬂexive from
the transitivity and reﬂexivity of the ⊆ relation. That the relation converges (i.e if
s0 ⊆t0 s1 ⊆ t1s2, then s0 ⊆t2 s2 for some t2 such that t2 ≥ t0 and t2 ≥ t1) can be
seen (for a denumerable language L) by picking a time large enough that all the tem-
poral extensions of s0, s1 and s2 become ﬁxed and unchanging. The monotonicity
of the valuation function with respect to subsequent veriﬁcation times follows from
the fact that all the sentences contained in Σts are also included in Σ
t+1
s . Monotonic-
ity of information growth for atomic sentences arises from the fact that all atomic
sentences are classed as stable, and so will be included in all states extending a state
that contains them.
Before showing that complex formulas also satisfy monotonicity of information
growth where appropriate, it is necessary to establish one other thing about these
canonical information models.
Partial monotonicity of semi-stable implications:
If φ → ψ ∈ Σts, then ∀s′, t′ if s′ ⊇t′ s, φ ∈ Σt
′
s′ and ¬(∃s′′, t′′ such that t ≤ t′′ < t′,
s ⊆t′′ s′′ ⊆t′′ s′ and φ ∈ Σt′′s′′ ,
then φ → ψ ∈ Σt′s′
Proof: (a) Suppose that ¬ψ ∈ Σts. It can be proved that {φ → ψ,¬ψ}  ¬φ and so
Σts has no φ-supporting extensions, minimal or otherwise. And so the condition is
vacuously true. (b) Suppose s′ ⊇t′ s, φ ∈ Σt′s′ and φ → ψ ∈ Σt
′
s′ . By the construction
of the model it follows that ¬ψ ∈ Σt′s′ . By (a) it can be seen that ¬ψ ∈ Σts, which
means that Σt
′
s′ cannot be a minimal φ-extension of Σ
t
s. That is, by the construction
of the model, there will be some Σt
′′
s′′ preceding Σ
t′
s′ and extending Σ
t
s in which φ
holds, and where ¬ψ does not.
In other words, semi-stable implications persist until their consequents become
false. Any minimal extension of a state in which a semi-stable implication holds to
support the implication’s antecedent will lead to a state in which the implication
still holds.
This result helps to nullify problems caused by the monotonicity of some unstable
formulas. Recall that unstable formulas can sometimes be valid or invalid (and
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hence monotonic), conjunctions or disjunctions of stable formulas with valid or
invalid unstable formulas, in-state negations of these formulas, or implications into
them. Taking Stable(Σ) to form the basis of extending information states might
seem to miss out on some of the monotonic formulas holding in Σ.
Only implication is of any concern. Since Σ is saturated, all conjunctions and
disjunctions and Σ are broken down into their component parts, and will be included
in Stable(Σ), and so will be included in states extending Σ. Valid (or invalid)
unstable formulas will be included (or excluded) in extensions of Σ (by the logical
closure of saturated sets), allowing monotonic conjunctions and disjunctions in Σ
to be reformed by logical closure. In-state negation can be pushed in so that it has
scope over atomic formulas, or out-of-state negations (∼ (φ → ψ) ≡∼ ¬(φ∧ ∼ ψ)).
Out of state negations, ¬φ are monotonic, and may either be valid or invalid, in
which case ∼ ¬φ is monotonic, or contingent, in which case ∼ ¬φ is non-monotonic.
In the former case, validities will be included and invalidities included in states
built on Stable(Σ) by logical closure, causing ∼ ¬φ to be excluded or included in
saturations of Stable(Σ) as required. When ¬φ is contingent, it will not and should
not be included in Stable(Σ).
With implication, note that φ → (ψ ∧ χ) is equivalent to (φ → ψ)∧ (φ → χ), so
problematic unstable monotonic conjunctions in the consequent get broken down
into their component parts. This leaves φ → (ψ ∨ χ), where χ is a valid or invalid
unstable formula. This is where the partial monotonicity of semi-stable implications
comes to the rescue. First, let χ be valid. Then ψ ∨ χ will never become false, and
so any extension of Σ will include φ → (ψ ∨χ) by the partial monotonicity of semi-
stable implications. Now let χ be invalid, and note that φ → (ψ ∨ ⊥) is equivalent
to φ → ψ, which is stable if ψ is stable, and so will be included in Stable(Σ).
Forcing and Containment
To ﬁnish the completeness proof, we need to establish that
s, t | ψ iﬀ ψ ∈ Σts
To set the ball rolling, for atomic sentences we deﬁne the forcing relation as
s, t | p iﬀ p ∈ Σts, atomic p
Then by an inductive argument we show that the same holds for complex formulas.
Note that Σts is deductively closed, and so ψ ∈ Σts iﬀ Σts  φ.
Conjunction
s, t | φ ∧ ψ iﬀ φ ∧ ψ ∈ Σts
Only if: Assume φ ∧ ψ ∈ Σts.
By ∧-E, φ ∈ Σts, ψ ∈ Σts.
By inductive hyp., s, t | φ, s, t | ψ.
By semantics of ∧, s, t | φ ∧ ψ.
If: Assume s, t | φ ∧ ψ.
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By semantics of ∧, s, t | φ, s, t | ψ.
By inductive hyp., φ ∈ Σts, ψ ∈ Σts.
By ∧-I, φ ∧ ψ ∈ Σts
Disjunction
s, t | φ ∨ ψ iﬀ φ ∨ ψ ∈ Σts
Only if: Assume φ ∨ ψ ∈ Σts.
By saturation of Σts, φ ∈ Σts, or ψ ∈ Σts.
By inductive hyp., s, t | φ or s, t | ψ.
By semantics of ∨, s, t | φ ∨ ψ.
If: Assume s, t | φ ∨ ψ.
By semantics of ∨, s, t | φ, or s, t | ψ.
By inductive hyp., φ ∈ Σts, or ψ ∈ Σts.
By ∨-I, φ ∨ ψ ∈ Σts
In-State Negation
s, t |∼ φ iﬀ ∼ φ ∈ Σts
Only if: Assume ∼ φ ∈ Σts
By construction of model, for all t′ ≥ t, ∼ φ ∈ Σt′s
By ∼-I, φ ∈ Σt′s
By inductive hyp., s, t′ | φ
By semantics of ∼, s, t |∼ φ
If: Assume s, t |∼ φ
By semantics of ∼, for all t′ ≥ t, s, t′ | φ
Suppose ∼ φ ∈ Σts and derive a contradiction:
By ∼-Ax, if ∼ φ ∈ Σts, then ∼∼ φ ∈ Σts
By semantics of ∼∼, ∃t′ ≥ t. s, t′ | φ
Contradiction.
Implication
s, t | φ → ψ iﬀ φ → ψ ∈ Σts
Only if: Assume φ → ψ ∈ Σts
Consider a minimal extension of Σts, Σ
t′
s′ , with respect to φ.
By the partial monotonicity of semi-stable implications, φ → ψ ∈ Σt′s′ (If φ → ψ is
stable it will be in Σt
′
s′ as a matter of course).
By →-E, ∼∼ ψ ∈ Σt′s′
By ind. hyp., s′, t′ | φ, s′, t′ |∼∼ ψ
By semantics of ∼∼, ∃t” ≥ t′. s′, t” | ψ
Since s′ ≈t′ s′, ∃s” ⊇t′ s′, ∃t” ≥ t′. s”, t” | ψ
Since s′ and t′ were arbitrary, by semantics of →, s, t | φ → ψ
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If: Assume s, t | φ → ψ
Suppose φ → ψ ∈ Σts and derive a contradiction:
By →-I, Stable(Σts), φ ∼∼ ψ
Let Σt
′
s′ be a saturated theory constructed from Stable(Γ) ∪ {φ} relative to ∼∼ ψ
and some enumeration of L
By construction of model, there will be such a Σt
′
s′ , where Σ
t
s ⊆t Σt
′
s′
∼∼ ψ ∈ Σt′s′ , and likewise for any Σt
′
s′′ ≈t′ Σt
′
s′
By ind. hyp., ∃s′ ⊇t s, t′ ≥ t. s′, t′ | φ but not ∃t′′ ≥ t′. s′, t′′ | ψ
Contradiction.
Out-of-State Negation
By analogy with implication: ¬φ =df φ → ⊥.
Completeness
To sum up: Constructing a model from Γ  φ, the state snapshot Σ00 contains
Γ but not φ. Consequently 0, 0 | Γ but 0, 0 | φ. So there is a model falsifying
Γ |= φ. Hence Γ |= φ.
D. Crouch, V. de Paiva / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 300 (2014) 3–2020
